Although real socio-economic injustices may have been the justification for the Egyptian revolution of 2011, it was not the cause of Egypt's politicization. Demonstrators peacefully toppled a strong western ally on the premise of high unemployment, lack of opportunity, lack of free elections, food inflation, corruption, and lack of democracy, among other factors. Why did social mobilization lead to a social movement against a state that's highly dependent on coercion? Considering that access to social networks, high unemployment, systematic corruption, and economic stagnation are all commonplace throughout the world; the Egyptian revolution is an anomaly. This paper argues that an analysis of the possible roots of the modern era of contentious politics in Egypt and its subsequent politicization will help demystify and decipher how this anomaly occurred. Focusing on the transnationally inspired dynamics of historically unprecedented protest events in relation to Egypt's political and social context will shed light upon the central question that this paper aims analyze; how and when did politics make the shift from internal social relations to contentious street politics?
There is ample evidence to support the prevailing narrative that traces failed neoliberal economic policies as the prime drivers of revolution, but these globally prevalent symptoms of neoliberalism fail to explain the politicization and subsequent mobilization of the Egyptian people. Answers concerning why this event occurred can be linked to failed neoliberal policies, but an analysis of the possible roots of the modern era of contentious politics (collective political endeavors) within Egypt will help demystify and decipher how this anomaly occurred. An economic analysis is essential to explaining the deep rooted frustrations that underline the fundamental concerns of the average participant of the mass, but fails to delineate the diverse forms of dynamic contentious politics that has characterized different episodes of protest within modern Egypt under Mubarak.
My analyses will primarily focus on the mechanisms and processes of Egypt's long history of contentious politics: the episodic and disruptive-techniques utilized by demonstrators against the state's interests. Focusing on the transnationally inspired dynamics of historically unprecedented protest events in relation to Egypt's political and social context will shed light upon the central question that this paper aims analyze; how and when did politics make the shift from internal social relations to contentious street politics? Sidney Tarrow's and Charles Tilly's differentiation between continuous politics limited to internal social relations and episodic contentious politics made collectively is critical to understanding why many Egyptians decided to participate in the revolution of 2011. The internal social relations that take place in political parties or interest groups "involves no collective public struggle whatsoever", while contentious politics occurs in public and "involves interaction between makers of claims and others" (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2004: 5) . Therefore, Tilly's and Tarrow's differentiation of politics sheds light on the logic behind why the pre-history of the Egyptian revolution occurred on the streets and not solely in parliaments, courts, unions, and political parties. Indeed, an obvious message of the Egyptian revolution has been that effective claim-making strategies within such an authoritarian environment must take place collectively, episodically, publically, and contentiously on the streets.
CONTENTIOUS POLITICS
In a shift to the analysis of process, Tarrow and Tilly schematize mechanisms of collective action that lead to episodes of contentious politics. According to Tarrow and Tilly, contentious politics is a combination of contention, politics, and collective action (Tarrow and Tilly 2006: 5) . Mechanisms are the certain "events that produce the same immediate effects over a wide range of circumstances" and processes "assemble mechanisms into combinations and sequences that produce larger scale effects" (Tarrow et al. 2006: 214) . These various mechanisms and processes allow us to better conceive the dynamics of the various episodes of contention within Egypt. Tilly's and were not aimed against the regime; however, they did create the possibility for the organization of anti-regime groups by challenging seemingly solidified norms. As we will see, the pro-Intifada and anti-Iraq war demonstrations were especially critical to the creation of the Egyptian revolution because they facilitated the creation of a network of activists, which eventually united previously disconnected groups and individuals into cooperative environments.
Dissent has always existed in Egypt, but some moments create long lasting if not permanent imprints, while others do not. This paper will focus on those episodes which generated profound alterations. Therefore, I maintain the argument, outlined in three sections, that:
1. The pro-Intifada protests, inspired by the second Palestinian Intifada, would have a profound impact on the internal dynamics of Egyptian contention by beginning to move politics from internal social relations and into the public sphere. Furthermore, it created a space of initial experimentation where although dissent was not directed at Mubarak; it did flirt with the validity of a decades old norm.
2. The impending U.S.-led Invasion of Iraq initiated an era of contentious street politics. The protests against the invasion of Iraq left an indelible mark on the public sphere by openly challenging Mubarak in large numbers; here was where a space of nascent contentious politics directed against the state was born.
3. The democracy movement, primarily Kifaya, was built on both of these spaces and created new opportunities for future dissent. Although still in an experimental stage Kifaya materialized into a movement that's sole purpose was to change the status-quo.
These three major events occurred over the terrain of the public and would help "The real challenge facing the organizers of the January 25 demonstration was not that they would be breaking a taboo against public protest; the challenge was in persuading potential participants that they could succeed. " (Lynch 2012: 85; my emphasis)
The cyber-activism that brought attention to the death suffered by Khalid Said and more critically the Jasmine Revolution in Tunisia undoubtedly persuaded many Egyptians that change was feasible via street politics. However, breaking the taboo of public protest along with the creation of once absent networks of activists can be traced to the proIntifada protests, the anti-Iraq war protests in 2003, and the subsequent creation of the democracy movement.
Furthermore, these three episodes allow us to analyze the dynamics of contention from a global perspective. For example, the contentious revitalization of long-standing transnational kinships and connections via 'illegal' protests were generated by external conflicts, which had serious internal consequences for the state.
Unprecedented mobilizations against external injustices within a country that had little space for low-risk environments of mass mobilizations created the possibility for a critical space that focused on internal injustices. As we will see, this overlap and eventual transition from the global to the local happened across space and time. In other words, single events of contention were neither necessary nor sufficient for the creation of the Egyptian revolution. Rather, critical mobilizations occurring at different times and spaces, together, created the necessary space for actors and organizations to form the networks of activists that eventually mobilized over internal injustices.
DOXA & OPINION
The Egyptian state has never attempted to become what Antonio Gramsci labeled the "night-watchmen of the liberal state"; however, a delicate balance of hegemony and coercion did exist (2000: 235). When the status quo was not continually threatened, Mubarak did not use the same degree of coercion as many regional dictatorships, "but this looser rule is a strength of the Egyptian system, not a weakness…Egypt's regime, like those of other Arab states, relies on a mix of co-option and coercion to ensure its rule" (Byman 2005: 75) . Therefore, as the cycles of protests shifted the balance in their favor, the state became increasingly more coercive and thus increasingly delegitimized by the people it attempted to control. As a result, the mechanism of boundary formation, the creation of us/them distinctions between the state and its contentious challengers, became increasingly solidified and widespread (Tilly and Tarrow 2007: 215) . By 2011 the divide between 'the people' and their state was clear, and a continuous change in identity on the side of the Egyptian people versus the state (boundary shift) became increasingly evident throughout the public sphere.
The weakening of the state would not have been possible without the unconventional creation of public discourse through contentious politics. Ultimately, these historical changes in Egyptian politics challenged fundamental self-evident universals that have privileged the regime.
The aforementioned interlinked events allowed the undiscussed to be more openly conversed. The boundary between the universe of the undiscussed (doxa) and the universe of discourse (opinion) was concrete prior to these experimental episodes of contentious politics. Prior to these events, the universe of doxa was effectively solidified which created a norm of compliance. The essential mechanism to this compliance has been the broad acceptance of the emergency law, which was perceived as an unshakable "truth" in Mubarak's Egypt. Enacted in 1958 and enforced after the Six-Day-War in 1967, it has affected virtually all Egyptians. The two elements of the law most relevant to this paper are the state's right to arrest and imprison anyone without warrant and the banning of all protests without government approval (Ghonim 2012: 2) .
The emergency law has clearly served as an effective tool for maintaining political power over the people, but more importantly; it has created the cultural hegemony that saturates many sectors of Egyptian society. With exception to a three year hiatus under late president Anwar Sadat; the emergency law is part and parcel of civil society. As such, contesting the validity of this tool was a direct threat to the durability of the regime. Therefore, we ought to view the repeated public disregard of this essential state apparatus through unauthorized protests, as public attacks against the unspoken hegemonic order of society.
The pro-Intifada demonstrations were the first events of mass contentious politics during Mubarak's presidency, even though they were directed at Israel and not publically at Mubarak. The state's weakness was exposed when the mere presence of bodies in the street challenged the hegemony of the emergency law. In a sense, the pro-Intifada protests helped move society from an unquestioned sphere of truths and into the sphere of discourse. However, such a fracture was only a condition of possibility, not a cause. The anti-war movement against the invasion of Iraq actually crossed a boundary, into the realm of cyclical contentious politics. The anti-war movement crossed ideological fault-lines and would culminate into an unprecedented occupation of Tahrir Square; past truths, like not publically challenging the regime, were broken. Two years after the occupation of Tahrir, a broad-based coalition of activists known as Kifaya, attempted and briefly entered the "universe of discourse". Kifaya briefly challenged the state, while a new discourse between orthodoxy and heterodoxy permeated throughout Egyptian society. In the end, these three separate yet interlinked events initiated a historical change to the point where the undiscussed became discussed, consequentially opening a new chapter in Egyptian politics. Pierre Bourdieu's work sheds light on breaking the self-evident through crisis.
The truths implanted by the Egyptian state are by no means natural; however, they did become norms on a societal level. Similarly, crisis, in this case through contentious politics, moved society from one boundary and into another: "Crisis is a necessary condition for a questioning of doxa but not in itself a sufficient condition for the production of a critical discourse" (Bourdieu 1977: 169) . In Egypt, breaking such norms required episodic, public, and collective crises against the interests of the dominant power holders. This weakness became public when the integrity of the state's "absolute truth" was questioned, temporarily restored, and then repeatedly questioned through more cycles of protests. Contentious politics emerges when opportunities broaden, potential for new alliances are present, and "when they reveal the opponents vulnerability" (Tarrow 1998: 23) . The vulnerability of the hegemonic order, that had gripped Egypt for . This externally generated environmental social mechanism would eventually set off a chain of cognitive and relational mechanisms throughout Egypt's rigid political structure. The initial manifestations of public protests took place at various university campuses. The supposed first act of protest occurred shortly after the gruesome images of a 12-year old Palestinian boy being shot dead in his father's arms were aired in Egypt where students at Cairo University protested and threw rocks at riot police. A few days after this event, roughly 6000 students attempted to storm the Israeli Embassy, but were dispersed by security forces. It was becoming evident that an unprecedented wave of student activism was rapidly permeating an ostensibly "apolitical" sector of society within the Mubarak era (Farag 2000) .
Eventually, the protests would include small demonstrations led by actors, entertainers, high school students, and from many prominent political parties, including the Muslim Brotherhood (primarily the youth faction), the nationalist liberal Wafd Party, and the socialist Tagammu Party. For the most part, the major political parties focused their anger towards Israel, while issuing statements urging Mubarak to close the Israeli Embassy in Cairo. In relation to the students, the political parties appeared "to have been shy, if not intimidated by the public reaction" (Farag 2000) . To say the least, the unity amongst the diverse political parties and historically antagonistic ideological groups that was present during the 2011 uprising was lacking. Furthermore, spatial and temporal unity was practically nonexistent, rather separate ephemeral events that sparked throughout Egypt at different places and times resulted in a consistency of outcome. In other words, the amalgamation of the various detached sites of protests into a unified mass in a defined area, like Tahrir Square, never happened.
The apogee of the student protests in Egypt occurred in the 1970s when hundreds of thousands of students from different universities occupied Tahrir Square and demanded that Anwar Sadat attack Israel to reclaim occupied land. The nature of student activism changed in 1979 when "the government clipped the students' wings by passing a new university law which forbade political activity by students-effectively confining student demonstrations to the campuses" (Schemm 2002 ). This law effectively broke the possibility of student mobilization beyond loose university-touniversity networks. Low-risk mobilization of the various universities was an obstacle, not only due to the spatial reality, but also the university law which circumscribed student-state battles "at the university gates-usually far away from the rest of the population" (Schemm: 2002 ).
In such a restrictive environment, "ecology-dependent" dynamics of mobilization may have been essential for a more formidable protest event (Zhao 1998 (Zhao : 1495 . This is especially true when considering that during this period the authoritarian environment in Egypt had left little space for low-risk spaces of mass mobilizations. Zones of toleration were few and therefore needed to be facilitated through other means. In short, Mubarak's response to the first ever unauthorized mass protest was a break with the overwhelmingly coercive stance towards dissent of the past. This regionally instigated rupture in hegemonic order within Egypt had a lasting effect on Egypt's public sphere which can be traced to the revolution in 2011. Essentially, the shift from internal social relations to contentious street politics within Mubarak's Egypt has its embryonic roots in the pro-Intifada protests and was further provoked during the anti-Iraq war protests in 2003.
ANTI-IRAQ WAR DEMONSTRATIONS
Leading up to the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, anti-war protestors again poured into the streets of Cairo for two consecutive days. "Cairo had witnessed two days of protests like nothing seen since the 1970s, complete with a day-long occupation of the central Tahrir Square" (Schemm 2003 ). This time the protestors vacillated between anti-war slogans and anti-regime anger, focus shifted from regional events to internal realities. "Baghdad is Cairo, Jerusalem is Cairo" and "we want Egypt to be free, life has become bitter" were common slogans during the protests . Needless to say, the strident public display of anti-regime sentiment was unprecedented during Mubarak's presidency; this was the initial test of the regime's, once stable, hegemony over unauthorized protests and the fear-barrier.
The most critical days during this period were the massive protests that occurred It is important to note that a unified political organization publically and explicitly challenging Mubarak was taboo before these movements surfaced. Kifaya Certain groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, faced limited repression and increasingly worked within state institutions and won parliamentary seats. Albeit, the authoritarian environment remained rigid, the spreading of technological changes created pockets of free public-opinion that had become more familiar to the average citizen.
Mubarak realized history demonstrates that a government which rejects all opposition with repression will either destroy the opposition or lead to a revolutionary polarization (Tarrow 1998: 148) . Therefore, Mubarak's selective repression worked in the short-run since Kifaya's strength flagged, but it also initiated a revolutionary polarization that followed its temporary extirpation. Mubarak's increased loss of legitimacy began to accelerate with these protests and would only increase with the new organized campaign of anti-government messages circling the internet. The groups rise should therefore be analyzed "in light of cycles of contention that preceded it" (El- 
CONCLUSION
Regional conflicts have played a vital role within Egypt's sovereign borders; these external events essentially fueled an unprecedented participation in contentious politics, which subsequently generated the politicization of the public sphere. Indeed, the base of this struggle seems to be aimed at changing collective perceptions, so that a transition from orthodoxy and into an unknown universe of discourse is possible. The social interaction among subjects, challengers, and members of the state led to the development of contention needed to oust Mubarak in 2011. Unfortunately, the ideological fault lines that were overlooked during the organization of the Egyptian revolution are again becoming focal points of Egyptian politics. Pluralism and Regionality have had remarkable effects on the mobilization of disparate groups of people within an authoritarian environment, but only time will tell if further social interaction in 'post-revolutionary' Egypt will lead to new cycles of contention or a return to the static realm of doxa.
